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RESPONSE TO FR. RHONHEIMER
ANNA BONTA MORELAND*
IT is a distinct privilege and challenge to respond to Fr. Rhonheimer’spaper: a privilege, of course, since I have long admired his work in Aqui-
nas’ ethics, and a challenge because such a carefully argued and lucid pa-
per makes my job as a respondent very difficult.
I find two related but distinct arguments in Fr. Rhonheimer’s paper.
The first offers a softer claim and the second a stronger one.  The first
argument emerges as an alternative to the traditional position of neo-scho-
lasticism.  For the neo-scholastics, in order to learn about what one
desires, one simply had to apply the results of what one learned through
theoretical inquiry.  Now this position is faithful neither to Aristotle, nor
to Aquinas.
Fr. Rhonheimer presents an alternative position, one in which ethics
do not follow upon metaphysics, learning about what one desires does not
follow upon learning about what one knows.  Instead, ethics has its own
proper starting point in the practical experience of acting subject.  Our
primary grasp of what is good for us is a practical grasp, and it arises out of
the human person’s natural desire for the good.
So far so good.
The second interrelated but distinct argument pushes further than
the first and raises a series of questions.
I will summarize the position first and then offer some questions for
reflection.  Fr. Rhonheimer argues both that knowledge of human nature
and natural ends do not presuppose theoretical knowledge (as in the first
argument), and that the opposite is true, namely that in order to know
human nature, one needs previous experience both of the acts of natural
practical reason and its objects, and of the ends of the natural inclinations.
In order to know the true, then, previous knowledge of the good is
necessary.
I am not sure this stronger argument is faithful, at least to Aquinas.  I
will point to one brief but significant moment in Aquinas’s corpus that
reflects his view that the true, that what is, that everything that exists, calls
out to us to be understood independent of our moral inclinations.  You
might raise your eyebrows at my selection of this text.  It is perhaps an
unusual place to go, but it is, I think, the most fitting for our purposes.
In the third objection of the Prima pars Question 12, article 12 on
whether the human person can know God by natural reason in this life,
one of the objectors states that knowledge of natural reason belongs to
both good and evil people, insofar as they share a common nature.  But
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knowledge of God belongs only to the good.  Aquinas gives an interesting
response, for he states that knowledge of God’s essence is, of course, by
grace, so it belongs only to the good.  But knowledge of God by natural
reason belongs to both good and evil people.
I mention this reply because if evil people can come to know God,
then surely they can come to know other things about what is, about meta-
physics, about human nature, without necessarily having to be ordered to
the good.  If evil people can come to know the cause of the created order
through natural reason, then they can use their reason to come to know
the created order.
Just as there is a dynamism to the good in Aquinas to which we are
naturally ordered and that we naturally desire—as Fr. Rhonheimer clearly
lays out in his paper—there is a dynamism to what is, to esse in Aquinas, to
which we are naturally ordered and that we naturally desire.
I agree with Fr. Rhonheimer that the principles of each order of in-
quiry are distinct but related.
We can agree that in a certain and limited way each presupposes the
other, but we cannot flip around the order of inquiry and give priority to
moral over theoretical questions.  If we do, then at the very least, we are
departing from the spirit of Aquinas’ text.
A related question arises for me during this discussion of the order of
inquiry.  Fr. Rhonheimer claims that the natural law pertains to the order
of knowing rather than the order of being, that it is a “cognitive reality in
the human soul that opens the way to fully understand human nature.”  In
the conclusion of his paper, he states that “Aquinas’ account of the natural
law is an account of the genesis and the natural principles of moral knowl-
edge, and not an ontological account of ‘nature’ or natural teleology as
such, though this epistemological account is anchored in strong ontologi-
cal presuppositions.”
I am happier with this second formulation of natural law than with
the first.  If we are going to talk about the natural law in the order of
knowing, then it has to be anchored in, to reflect, what is to be known,
what is to be desired.  So I wonder in the end what the cash value is of
stating so starkly that the natural law is in the order of knowing rather
than the order of being.
I get the sense in this paper that Fr. Rhonheimer thinks metaphysical
inquiry falls into the modernist illusion of being objective inquiry, one
that pretends to stand outside itself, but that ethics escapes this illusion,
being rooted as it is in the practical subject.  But what if we were to recog-
nize that for Aquinas, metaphysics is just as rooted in the human subject as
ethics, just in different aspects of that subject, namely in the theoretical
intellect instead of the practical intellect?  We could set aside, then, some
of the criticisms that Fr. Rhonheimer places at the door of the neo-
scholastics.
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Finally, I could not help but notice Fr. Rhonheimer’s optimism with
respect to children’s immediate grasp of the goods involved in their natu-
ral inclinations.  This mother of four is not sure that grasp is as immediate
as I would like.  I do not see my children more immediately inclined to-
ward the good than toward the true.  But this would move today’s discus-
sion too much into the practical realm.
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